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Abstract This article studies the role of entrepreneurship in business ethics and
promotes a resource-based ethics. The need for and usefulness of this form of ethics
emerge from an analysis of contemporary business ethics that appears to be inef-
ficacious and from a moral business practice formed out of the relationship between
the veal calf industry of the VanDrie Group and the Dutch Society for the Protection
of Animals (DSPA) in their development and implementation of a Welfare Hall-
mark for calves. Both organizations created jointly a new meat segment in the
market by trust-building and partnership. The relationship shows a remodeling of
capabilities of both organizations in the light of co-creation of values. The VanDrie
Group established an effectuation of moral goals by being socially sensitive and
resource-minded. The DSPA created openings for dialogue by being pragmatic in its
ideals. Philosophically, this article sketches a resource-based ethics with Deweyan
concepts as end-in-view and transactionality of means and ends. Both organizations
show in their entrepreneurship the ability to create, what is called ‘‘Room for
Maneuver’’ by exploring, socializing, individualizing, and growing. By maneu-
vering they set off a form of co-evolution between business and ethics. This article
demonstrates what actual moral entrepreneurship can do in bringing about moral
change by combining effectively social, policy, norm, and economic related values.
Keywords Business and society  Moral values  Animal welfare  Co-evolution 
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Introduction: Ethics and Resources
There are clear signs that business ethics is struggling with its potentials. Business
and ethics both address the societal demands for a better, more honest, cleaner, and
more respectful world, but there activities do not always give satisfying results (De
George 2006, cf. Garriga and Mele 2004). In society the call for restoring moral
agency in business becomes louder, but we still witness business scandals as
disgraceful accountancy, environmental spoils, health threat by contained food
products and extravagant bonuses for top managers. In reaction, the academic world
tries to understand and control moral situations by analyzing concepts such as
autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice, but the ethical evaluation of
business practices and the proliferation of frameworks (cf. Waddock 2004) make
that managers are not keen for philosophical contemplations (De George 2006). In
the corporate field, business ethics develops in its own internal structures codes,
standards and procedures, to stimulate or even enforce ethical conduct of employees
and to transmit values within the firm and to maintain a certain corporate culture,
but Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) often face skepticism since they are seen
as a glossy and instrumental mark to polish the company’s public image (Porter and
Kramer 2006).
Overall, the ethics in business reveals several gaps between moral aspirations and
practical implementations. These are gaps between ‘‘what we want’’ and ‘‘what we
can do’’ and illustrate the misunderstanding and underestimation of the complexity
of the moral world business has to operate (Pompe and Korthals 2010). Conferences
on CSR show the appeal of moral concepts and principles and at the same time the
embeddedness of the social and economic barriers. The gap between ends and
means appears to be big enough to create a paralyzing divide between principles and
practice (Pompe and Korthals 2009).
Seeing the current state of business ethics, there is a need for another perspective.
One that does not focuses on decision-making and business dilemmas or on
formalizing good conduct into codes (cf. Harris et al. 2009) but one that focuses on
resources to create moral change or contribute to it. This resource-based ethics, as
one can call it, leans to moral entrepreneurship. First, because it is an ethics that is
based on entrepreneurial actions as discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of
opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman 2000) or on seeking for ‘‘a new good, a
new method of production, new market, new source of supply, new materials or
parts and new organization to restore an economic disruption of equilibrium’’
(Schumpeter 1934: 84). Second, it is moral because of the social dimension when
business is aiming at public change with groundbreaking scale and effect, or of the
policy aspect when innovative ideas are promoted to the public sector in the hope
for support or new ideas, or even the norm-oriented element when entrepreneurship
is creating a ‘‘norm bandwagon’’ to change social norms whereby small shifts in
norms lead to rapid revision of its prevailing norms (Pozen 2008).
From a more philosophical level, the orientation on a resource-based ethics can
be seen as a result of the inefficacy of mainstream business ethics. There is a
dominance of the rationalistic and generalistic mode of ethics in its effort to
(re)shape concepts, principles, and standards to understand and guide the pluralistic
314 V. Pompe
123
world. Commonly, ethics is, as Sen (2009) indicates, transcendental when it
examines the nature of ethical phenomena, as ‘‘the just,’’ ‘‘the free,’’ ‘‘the harm,’’
and ‘‘the good,’’ in order to find or outline the perfect arrangement and guidelines
for change. This rationalistic and top-down nature is still regarded as the core of
ethics. Solomon (2007), in his ‘‘Introduction of Ethics,’’ defines ethics as a ‘‘study of
values and justification as well as the actual values and rules of conduct by which
we live’’ (12) and ‘‘ethics is not just a varied collection of ‘do’s and don’ts’ but a
system of values and principles which tie together in a reasonable and coherent way
in order to make our society and our lives as ‘civilized’ and as happy as possible’’
(13). Anther example of transcendental and arrangement-focused ethics comes from
Mepham’s ethical matrix (2000) in which principles and values are coherently tided
together to assist sound judgments and decision-making about the ethical
acceptability of action and policies. It cross-links prima facie principles, referring
to wellbeing, autonomy, and justice, borrowed from Beauchamp and Childress
(1994), with selected interest groups. Mepham’s idea is that through the application
of ethical principles on the interests of stakeholders, ethical problems can be
identified and appropriate responses can be guided. In business ethics, Zimmerli and
Assla¨nder (2007) suggest a similar hierarchy starting from principles at the top,
regional (time and place related) standards and professional code of conduct as sub-
layers and at the bottom material values. The way to use (business) ethics in the
classical way, transcendental and arrangement-focused, may lead to some heuristic
insights, but is doubtful whether it influences working-floor experience. The
inefficacy is due to centralizing the end but disregarding the means.
Resource-based ethics leans to Sen’s realization-focused and comparative
approach, in which different social realizations are compared in order to find some
criteria to determine what makes one situation ‘‘less unjust’’ than another. It, therefore,
also allies strongly with pragmatism. Rorty holds a similar line of thought as Sen in a
debate about applied ethics (2006a) by stating that ethics should not aim its effort at the
justification of principles and standards but should focus on analyzing cases and
revealing relevant differences (2006b). Also for Rorty, the task for ethics is not to
construct coherence but to find in practical situations consistency and with that,
predictability. The pragmatic soil Sen and Rorty are standing on is clear: truth and
knowledge are a result of experience, i.e., the practical consequences of a proposition.
Besides, pragmatism stresses that values and principles are formed out of the practice,
which means that ethics is not about imperatives but about hypotheses, emerged from
the past with its record of success and tested in a new situation (Dewey 1929; Buchholz
and Rosenthal 2005). Keulartz et al. (2002) formulate the difference between
principle-oriented ethics and pragmatism in terms of justification and discovery. An
ethics of justification defends a moral outcome or course of action by arguments or
good reasons, while the pragmatist’s idea of ethics is an ethics of discovery that seeks
purposely for heterogenic confrontations in order to grow from the experience of
dealing with or overcoming conflicts. Restoring frustrated situations is the pragmatic
core of ethics. For pragmatism, ethics is melioristic with its belief that it is worthwhile
to put effort in advancing the common good. This attitude of improvement, progress,
and betterment is a philosophically robust concept of hope that can function as a guide
for critique and inquiry (Koopman 2009: 15).
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Discovering new values for a breakthrough towards moral change or improve-
ment is what business and ethics have in common. According to Bucholz and
Roosenthal (2005) both fields need the same management properties as thought-
fulness regarding understanding concrete human existence in its richness, diversity,
and complexity, imagination to see authentic possibilities and creative intelligence
to reorganize and order capabilities (cf. Hannafey 2003). Pragmatic ethics and
business are both about dealing with a social and a physical environment, events
that are inseparable and transactional (cf. Dewey and Bentley, 1949), and about
changing these realities for the good by overcoming problems. Both fields aim at
modifying or innovating a practice for which social mindedness, change orientation,
imagination, creativity, and the ability to exploit the new are pivotal competences
(cf. Fesmire 2003; Werhane 1999).
Change depends more on the creative use of actual resources than on wishful
ideas. This article, therefore, explores the potential for a resource-based ethics, as an
academic field and as a real business practice. It discusses an example of
entrepreneurship regarding ethical issues by describing and analyzing the relation-
ship in the Netherlands between two organizations with different and sometimes
opposing interests: the veal calf industry of the VanDrie Group and the Dutch
Society for the Protection of Animals (DSPA). Both organizations found common
ground to improve the welfare quality of calves according to a one-star Better Life
Hallmark. They jointly created a new order by putting an intermediary meat
segment on the market.
The development of the better life hallmark for calves was object for a case study
based on a triangulation of desk research, interviews with cross-reference, and
participant observation. Both organizations were interviewed through the method of
Responsive Dialogue by which practices are described and analyzed by the
experience of actors and narratives, in the light of social facts and ethics, with the
aim to enhance the understanding of a situation from a variety of perspectives
(Abma and Widdershoven 2006; Widdershoven et al. 2009). All interviews were
recorded and a written summary was presented to the interviewees for approval.1
Insight into this relationship, the case study brings forward, is used in this article to
demonstrate moral change and gain more understanding on how resource-based
ethics develops.
In this article I will first discuss the relationship between the VanDrie Group and
the DSPA. Next, based on pragmatism, a more philosophical analysis is given of
this relationship in terms of transactionality of means and ends in order to present a
deeper support for a resource-based ethics. The following section will demonstrate
how the relationship created and effectuated room for maneuver and consequently a
co-evolution of practices. In the final section I will discuss critically this case study
1 This is researched mainly by interviewing Bert van den Berg, senior policy maker of DSPA, and Henny
Swinkels, Director Corporate Affair, and Jacques de Groot Head of RandD of the VanDrie Group.
Interviews with the two organisations were held separately, for reason of cross reference. The information
processed here comes from approved interview reports 2010 by the parties: Verslag Co-evolutie van
waarden, Dierenbescherming en Verslag Co-evolutie van waarden, VanDrie Groep, Stichting Promotie
Kalfsvlees. Additionally, the desk research of annual reports of both organisation: VanDrie Group MVO
Annual Report 2007–2008; Jaarverslag Dierenbescherming (DSPA Reports from 2005 till 2008).
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and draw some conclusions. All of this, I hope, will contribute to more a workable
ethics.
VanDrie Group and DSPA Moving Towards the Welfare Hallmark
The relationship between the VanDrie Group and the Dutch Society for the
Protection of Animal (DSPA) is not of recent history and the hallmark does not
come from nowhere. This section will first describe the relation between the
organizations, especially the process of dialogue and collaboration. Next, the
backgrounds are analyzed more closely, in particular, the business strategy of the
VanDrie Group and the policy approach of the DSPA.
Long Relation VanDrie—DSPA
The VanDrie Group is the largest integrated veal company in the world. The holding
comprises more than twenty businesses that feeds and nurses almost 1.4 million
calves a year and processes them to 1,700 products (meat, leather, glue etc.). The
DSPA is a professional NGO, with 200,000 members and about 65 permanent
employees that stands up for the interests of all animals in society at the private,
public, and political level.
In 2009 the VanDrie Group received a one-star Better Life Hallmark from the
DSPA. The Better Life Hallmark guarantees a certain level of welfare during the
process of rearing the animals for meat production. With a one-star hallmark the
VanDrie Group certifies that all its animals will have a welfare management regime
that results in: no suffering of anemia, high fiber roughage twice the minimum
statutory requirement, better stable comfort and living space, and in 10 years’ time
transport in fully climate controlled vehicles.
The awarding of the hallmark is an outcome of a long debate about veal
consumption and calf welfare that started in the 1980s. Prior to the 1990s, calves
were held in poor conditions to increase the ‘‘whiteness’’ of the meat. This pale
color was considered desirable as it guaranteed the tenderness, the taste, and the low
fat of the meat. For these consumption qualities the calves’ hemoglobin (Hb) level
was kept low by limiting the movement through solitary box housing and feeding
them with artificial milk and low roughage. VanDrie defends that regime with: ‘‘in
those days, change of regime was rejected by many farmers and consumers with the
argument ‘then veal becomes bull meat’.’’ A call for change was inevitable, but
came not only from politics. The farmers themselves expressed their concerns about
the unnaturalness of this form of husbandry. They foresaw the societal rejection of
‘‘white meat’’. Eventually, in 1994, Dutch Parliament mandated immediate change
in the roughage for calves to stop abomasal ulcers and demanded group housing by
2004. The EU mandated in 1997 the immediate increase in roughage and group
housing by 2007.
At first glance, the 2009 hallmark qualification does not look so special since it
can be seen as a direct consequence of legislation. However, regulations are unclear
about what is meant by acceptable Hb-level, substantial roughage, and group
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housing. For the farming industry the composition of the feed and the number of
animals per unit have a direct effect on the profit and loss account. Nevertheless, the
VanDrie Group aimed at more social acceptance and actively approached the
DSPA: first for consultation and at a later stage for collaboration. The relationship
between the VanDrie Group and DSPA started as early as 1988, which is six years
before legislation. In that year the Foundation ‘‘Group Veal’’ (Stichting Gro-
epskalfsvlees) was established by some cattle farming associations, including the
predecessors of VanDrie Group, and the DSPA. This foundation was a platform for
expressing and sharing concerns and for active deliberation. In 2001 the relation
intensified because veal from group housing was common in the market and the
VanDrie Group wanted to excel in new animal welfare quality.
For the DSPA, anemia in calves was its number-one issue. The VanDrie Group
addressed this concern by suggesting scientific research on the relation between the
level of Hb and animal suffering.2 It took 2 years of preparation to implement a
regime that results in a higher Hb-level. This time was needed because veal is a
complex product. The animals are fed with about 100 ingredients and after the
slaughter the entire animal is processed into 1,700 products. The whole practice
involves different chain members whose activities are monitored by a rigid quality
system. Changing one aspect may have implications, technological or human, for
other components of the system. Besides, the rearing of calves itself is difficult as
the animals are ‘‘by-products’’ of milk cows and therefore genetically uncontrol-
lable for the VanDrie Group (in contrast with pig and hen farming). Implementing
welfare measures is, therefore, dealing with gene expression of individual calves of
in a more biological term with phenotypic variations. On the 20th of January 2009
the VanDrie Group was awarded with a one-star Better Life Hallmark of the DSPA.
The firm’s quality system could guarantee: twice as many high-fiber roughage than
legally required; no anemia; soft floors in the future; no longer than 8-h transport to
and from calve feeders; and no longer than 4-h transport to the slaughterhouse.
The whole process of dialogue and collaboration continues. The two organiza-
tions meet each other 3 or 4 times a year to discuss their concerns and the VanDrie
Group even shares with DSPA the successes and failures of its experiments to
improve the welfare system.
Background 1, VanDrie Group: Being Resource-Minded
The moral entrepreneurship of VanDrie stands out in the group of direct
competitors. Veal calf integrators as Lactalis/Tendriade, Denkavit, and Bigard are
operating on the market with rose meat, but do not show any CSR activities on their
websites let alone a dialogical and participative relationship with animal protection
organizations. This omission of animal welfare policy in their profile makes the
contrast with the VanDrie Group stronger.
2 Science determined that a Hb level under 4.5 mmol/l was equivalent to clinical anaemia and the
concentration between 4.5 and 6 can be regarded as a ‘‘grey area’’ (EFSA 2006). Based on these data the
VanDrie Group and DSPA agreed on the regulation that the average Hb-level of all kept calves must be
6 mmol/l and none of the levels must be under 4.5. For the one-star-hallmark the welfare parameters are
stricter: the average must be 7 with none under 6 to make sure that no animal suffers from anaemia.
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Tendriade or Lactalis seems to have no public reports and the information on the
Lactalis website is meager. This is somewhat remarkable because ‘‘transparency is’’
one of the main company values, but apparently the firm applies this value to
strategic objectives only.3 What is known of Tendriade is that it is part of the milk
producer and processor Lactalis, whose main products are cheese and chilled dairy.
Although Tendriade produces white meat, it has a rose´ system with conventional
open straw yards and draught warm lying areas. Denkavit is an integrator that does
not slaughter. The company rears 160,000 calves per year in the Netherlands and
200,000 calves per year in France. Further information about this firm is also
minimal.4 The Denkavit Group claims to be the leading partner for livestock
farmers and the top compound feed industry in the Netherlands and abroad and
publishes only manuals and guidelines to optimize their rearing management and
not so much to improve animal welfare (Trierum 2006; Veld 2010). Finally, the
French company Bigard, which slaughters between 350.000 and 390.000 calves per
year, is a non-integrator who claims that 30 years of history in slaughtering, carving
and manufacturing of processed products, cultivated the ‘‘art of meat.’’ Also with
this firm there appear to be no annual reports other than the web pages with some
simple facts and figures about turnovers, staff and production.5
This short survey demonstrates the difference in moral maturity regarding animal
welfare between the VanDrie Group and its main European competitors. According
to VanDrie’s annual report (cf. note 1) the company builds its CSR policy on three
values: openness, dialogue, and collaboration. The firm regards the relationship with
NGOs, authorities and politicians as essential for its license to produce. This license
is not considered as a negative or reactive duty to stay in line with the rules of
society but as a more positive and proactive task to listen to societal concerns in
order to improve the firm’s products and services. The company’s annual report
shows clear signs that CSR is taken seriously. There is a triple P strategy, in which:
‘‘People’’ refers to investment in employees, safe food and responsible nutrition for
consumers and transparency towards society; ‘‘Planet’’ guides the consideration for
the environment, in particular manure control, and healthy animals; healthy business
operations and business future, outline the ‘‘Profit’’ part. All the 3P’s are
consistently applied in the chain with veal farmers, feed producers, slaughterhouses,
and calfskin processors. The company endorses CSR related objectives as: more
efficient use of energy; writing a ‘‘Master Plan for the Rational Use of Antibiotics’’
to secure animal health with minimizing the risk to public health; and supporting the
Conscious Choice label (Ik Kies Bewust) to motivate consumers in their choice for
healthier food. These CSR activities may be impressive. However, from the
perspective of ethics, the VanDrie’s internal business mottos that guide these
external interests are more interesting.
The first and foremost is the axiom of if you do something, do it in an acceptable
way. This acceptability refers to feasibility since it has more an internal operational
than a social meaning. As the firm states: ‘‘in making policies, the company first
3 See http://www.lactalis.fr/english/groupe/valeurs.htm visited 20 December 2010.
4 See http://www.denkavit.nl/corporate/denkaveal.asp?taal=uk visited 20 December 2010.
5 See http://www.bigard.fr visited 21 December 2010.
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looks at what it can achieve by setting sensible goals and finding internal support.’’
This is in contrast to most organizations that appear to set moral goals before
gathering the resources to pull it through. Another quote is: ‘‘in theory, change
management looks easy but implementation fails when players in the chain cannot
handle the new tasks.’’ That is why the VanDrie Group proclaims: start working
from the resources at hand. It means looking at what goals can be set from resources
and seeing what can be achieved with resources. Business strategy and implemen-
tation should be regarded as intertwined and inseparable. Setting objectives must
result from the dialectic of the-how-and-the-what or the-means-and-the-end.
Remarkable, in the firm’s own words, is that its management is neither top-down
or bottom-up but centered-oriented, which means that not the farmer, the calves, the
consumer or politics is the core of business but the balance of their interests. Before
changing from ‘‘white’’ to ‘‘rose’’ veal and from ‘‘open’’ to ‘‘closed’’ climate control
transport, internal conflicts had to be taken into the scheme of management. This
means understanding and accepting the resistance to change. Most of the time
rejection results from unfamiliarity with the new concept and uncertainty of one’s
employment and income. Good entrepreneurship, according to VanDrie, includes
‘‘sympathy for small calf farming businesses which are forced to keep up with the
high market standards on food safety and animal welfare which are set by the firm’s
scale of business.’’ Conflicts and responsibilities make ‘‘If you do something, do it
in an acceptable way’’ not a simple embracement of other’s moral ideas. An
entrepreneur should have his main focus on the internal affairs since every
effectuation of a moral desire depends on the ability of the resources at hand. In this
case it includes the workers and the cooperating firms.
A second motto of the VanDrie Group is quality through quantity. Producing
veal is meeting qualities regarding animal welfare, food safety, and sustainability.
Interestingly, the VanDrie Group guarantees these qualities by linking them directly
to quantity. By concentrating veal farms, feed production and slaughterhouses in the
Netherlands, volume is created to develop, implement, and improve quality
standards. Concentration of resources means, apart from increasing market-power,
reduction of product costs and, hence, more room for a welfare quality that
consumers can afford and are willing to pay for. Starting local plants in order to stop
the long transport of calves, from e.g., Ireland and England, will, according to the
VanDrie Group, reduce the ‘‘overall’’ welfare of the animals. The firm states that
‘‘local plants cannot produce at low costs and hence have not the profit to invest in
quality.’’ The VanDrie Group strongly believes, therefore, that nowhere in the world
do calves in an industrial setting have a better welfare than in the firm’s
environment. Although, from a research point of view, the factuality of this claim is
unknown, the statement expresses a conviction that extra value can be created from
concentrating resources. Resource management is VanDrie’s ticket. It is departing
from I can to arrive at I want.
Background 2: DSPA and the Benefit of Being Pragmatic
The collaboration with meat producers is for the Dutch Society for the Protection of
Animals a very sensitive issue. By committing to the hallmark, ‘‘the organization is
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putting its logo on a piece of dead animal.’’ Some members, especially the
vegetarians, find it difficult to match the hallmark policy with the Society’s
objective to respect the animal’s intrinsic value by seeing animals as independent
sentient beings with awareness and integrity.
The position of the DSPA among its European peers is, just as VanDrie,
remarkable. The ‘‘Eurogroup for Animals’’ reports shortcomings and improvement
of policies regarding the use of animals in the member states of the EU but does not
report intensive collaboration with farming industry.6 There are some animal
welfare quality schemes such as ‘‘Label Rouge’’ in France, ‘‘Freedom Food’’ in the
UK, and the brand ‘‘Neuland’’ in Germany,7 but they do not match the impact of the
Dutch one-star welfare hallmark.
Sister organizations such as the Tierschutz and the British RSPCA have not
employed the participative and collaborative approach as the DSPA did. Their main
strategy is campaigning against abuse and suffering and for more respect and
welfare. All associations share the approach of stimulating local initiatives and
political pressure, but the main difference, among the many similarities, between the
DSPA and its European sisters is that the activities of the latter function as a protest
against existing situations and not as participation in creating a new situation. The
reason for this may be found in the so-called Dutch Polder Model. This is a
decision-making model in which pluriformity is acknowledged and issues are
formulated and policies are set on the basis of consensus between major
stakeholders. This approach of discourse brings oppositions closer in a workable
position. The omission of such a communication model in other countries may well
explain why brands as Neuland and Freedom Foods are far away from conventional
farming and why the DSPA operates in the intermediary field.
The strategy of the DSPA with the Better Life Hallmark is to create a so called
intermediary segment (‘‘tussensegment’’ in Dutch). This segment contains new
welfare defined products and forms an alternative for the 98 percent of the market’s
industrial meat, on the one side, and the more expensive organic products that
includes the remaining 2 percent, on the other side. In other words: the original
market offered only a choice between ‘‘no-star’’ and ‘‘three-star’’ welfare hallmarks.
By creating an intermediary segment, the DSPA’s ability to improve the welfare
conditions of millions of animals in industrial farming advanced enormously. An
intermediary segment opens possibilities to develop more welfare friendly products
for an affordable price (Ingenbleek et al. 2004, 2006a, b). The Better Life Hallmark
was introduced in 2007 for broiler hens (Volwaardkip) to give the animals a slower
growth rate, more space, natural day-night rhythm, outdoor run and straw as
distraction material. In 2010 the hallmarks, 1, 2 and 3 stars, are applied on 26
different meat products and are available in all Dutch supermarkets and in the major
foodservice and catering companies.
6 Eurogroup for Animals 2010, Areas of concern analysis of animal welfare issues in the European
Union.
7 See http://www.poultrylabelrouge.com/; http://www.rspca.org.uk/freedomfood; http://www.neuland-
fleisch.de/ all visited 22 December 2010.
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The success of the DSPA in developing and promoting the intermediary segment
lies ‘‘in putting welfare into the economic structure and respecting farmers instead
of condemning them.’’ This approach created an open atmosphere for dialogue and
joint venture. It can be seen as a shift from the Society’s original policy which was
focused on classical campaigning against the abuse and neglect of animals. In the
last 30 years only as recently as 2008 did, negotiation became the other stance of
policy and the annual report included the strategy of dialogue and partnership for
creating a better world for animals in society (cf. note 1, DB, 2008). The 2007 and
2008 annual debates with the members on the course of the Society ended in a clear
approval for the pragmatic road of dialogue and partnership in order to enhance
welfare improvement for the vast majority of farming animals. However, the fact
remains that some members still find it difficult to deliberate with those who are
treating animals as simple commodities. With the Better Life Hallmark the DSPA
distinguishes itself from sister organizations which are less willing to participate in
multiple-stakeholder deliberation and to seek compromises.8
The remarkable relation between the VanDrie Group and the DSPA reveals itself
by the mutual drive to bring forward change in the welfare of animals while starting
from completely different and at some points diametrically opposed backgrounds.
The VanDrie Group still clings to industrial farming but with the awareness of the
license to produce granted by society. The DSPA starts from a moral license to
protect but with the awareness of the market-economic forces and limitation for
industry to bring about (radical) change. Both organizations see that change is
incremental and that dialogue and building trust is the best formula for
collaboration. In the next section this relation will be further analyzed from the
perspective of transactionality of means and ends in order to support a resource-
based ethics.
Business ethics as resource based
The VanDrie-DSPA case demonstrates an ethics of creating a new value from
practice in order to meliorate a situation. The case also shows that the position of
resources in entrepreneurial practice is more dominant than the economic end, as
Sarasvathy enfolds. In her model of entrepreneurship, the means-driven activity is
key because it ultimately assesses the effectuation of efforts. Especially VanDrie
employs a strategy that Sarasvathy would call ‘‘bird-in-hand’’ principle because
something new is created ‘‘with existing means rather than discovering new ways to
achieve given goals’’ (2008: 15). For Sarasvathy the ‘‘question is ‘‘What can we
do?’’ with our means rather than ‘‘What should we do?’’ given our environment’’
(2008: 248). Moral entrepreneurship, therefore, is strongly linked with the ability to
perform. The case study presented here shows that resources are not only essential
for changing but also for interpreting reality. In this section the theoretical
8 Organizations as ‘‘Wakker Dier’’ (Alert Animal) which operates mainly in the campaigning field
regarding all forms of industrial animal farming : http://www.wakkerdier.nl/docs/jaarverslag2009, and
‘‘Stichting Varkens in Nood’’ (Pigs in Need) which focuses on pigs only and claims to have an intellectual
and civilised campaigning approach; http://www.varkensinnood.nl.
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background for a resource-based ethics is further explained by using Dewey’s
concept of transactionality and his distinction between ‘‘ends’’ and ‘‘ends-in-view.’’
Dewey makes a practical difference between an end and an end-in-view as
respectively between a remote and final goal and a usable plan to shape the course
of events (Dewey 1925: 101). This difference is important for strategy formulation
and policy making. Some goals we make are remote and unattainable at least in the
near future, such as forming an ideal society, becoming old and happy, creating a
world in which animals are not subjugated. These remote goals do not have much
impact on our behavior apart from our imaginations and aspiration because it is not
sure when the end is reached. End-in-view arises, as Dewey puts it, ‘‘when a
particular consequence is foreseen and being foreseen is consciously adopted by
desire and deliberatively made the directive purpose of action’’ (Dewey and Tufts
1909: 199). This means what is in view becomes part of the way to reach the end.
Aspirations are turned into a concrete plan when they are put in direct relation with
the means to attain them (Dewey 1925: 280). Consequently an end needs a view to
become realistic and attainable and an end without a view will be regarded as ideal
or as unrealistic. Applying this to business, entrepreneurs only work with ends-in-
view, so ethics must focus on moral ends-in-view to reach the business mind.
To analyze this a bit deeper, I want to draw attention to the pragmatic concept of
transaction, which shares a resemblance in its meanings with entrepreneurship. In
business, a transaction refers commonly to an ‘‘exchange of goods, services or
funds.’’ In the pragmatic version, a transaction means ‘‘a ‘deal’ that has been ‘put
across’ by two or more actors’’ (Dewey and Bentley 1949: 116f). For Dewey
exchange is not focused on the result but on the process like events as ‘‘organism
and environment.’’ Key in the meaning of transaction is that events are inseparable
as Dewey explains:’’no one would be able successfully to speak of the hunter and
the hunted as isolated with respect to hunting.’’ (1949: 133, my italics). This means
that hunting is not a self-action because the hunter depends on wildlife to shoot.
Neither is hunting an interaction between the hunter and the hunted because that
would mean that before the hunting there can be a hunter without the hunted and
vice versa. Transaction signifies the influence events have on those involved and
that the result of that influence makes something happen (hunter ? hunted = hunt-
ing). Dewey’s distinction between the hunter and the hunted reflects his stimulus—
response model. Dewey rejects that stimulus and (bodily) response are separated
entities. In his ‘‘reflex arc’’ concept a stimulus becomes a stimulus after it is
interpreted as such by the subject (Dewey 1972). A child who burns itself does not
withdraw its hand (response) after feeling the flame of the candle (stimulus). It is not
a sensation of light and heat that makes the hand withdraw but an act of seeing and
feeling. The stimulus is therefore part of the response. With this insight Dewey
underpins his claim that the agent and environment are inseparable and mutually
formed. For business ethics this signifies that a moral end is seen by the
entrepreneur as one (in-view) from the means at hand.
The distinction between end and end-in-view and the claims on transactionality
are Dewey’s ways to reject any bifurcation of reason and experience in ethics. This
division is still present in mainstream ethics today which sees its ‘‘core business’’ as
looking for and constructing coherency between ethical concepts, values, and
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principles in order to justify and guide behavior. This form of ethics subordinates
experience what may explain the difficulty it has in understanding an ethical
practice such as business. Concepts as end-in-view and transactionality denote a
unity of reason and experience. Again, for entrepreneurship this stands for an
inseparable relation between means and end. As Khalil (2003) paraphrases Dewey
‘‘the set of means involves meaning, i.e., the set of means is not given independently
of the context afforded by the ends.’’ Khalil emphasizes that ‘‘means of
entrepreneurship are not given but acquire their significance from the context, in
particular the end empowered by the belief one comes to acquire.’’ It is therefore not
the market that dictates the entrepreneurship, but business (hunting) emerge
endogenously (from the hunter) in a field of exogenous market forces (presence of
the hunted ? conditions as weather, etc.).
This underlines that a company embodies its business ideas from its resources. It
cannot work with ends that do not (cannot) have the company’s view on means. I
connect here with the ideas of Joas (1996) who expresses this dependency in terms
as situatedness, corporeality, and sociality. An action does not take place in a
situation but the situation itself determines the action. Each situation induces
experience, shapes our perceptions and understandings of the world, which makes to
revise our actions in our response: ‘‘it is not sufficient to consider human actions as
being contingent on the situation, but it should also be recognized that the situation
is constitutive of action’’ (Joas 1996: 160). A situation is, hence, not a pre-
established means-ends framework, as in the rational action theory, but a state of
learning in which generated actions continually are revised. Regarding the
corporality, perception and action are rooted in a body with its sensory, locomotive
and communicative powers. We experience and control the world we live in
corporately. According to Joas, ‘‘Given that the fundamental forms of our capacity
for action lie in the intentional movement of our body in connection with
locomotion, object-manipulation and communication, our world is initially struc-
tured according to these dimensions’’ (1996: 158). Joas emphasizes that beings are
embodied beings and therefore that moral agents are embodied moral agents. Joas
view on human action reflects Merleau-Ponty’s workspaces as ‘‘one’s being-in-the-
world through one’s own lived body’’ (1962/1945: 151). It is maybe philosophically
problematic to extend the biological meaning of the concept body to a more
industrial or economic significance. However, the concept ‘‘body’’ has an
aggregative sense, as something that embodies or gives concrete reality (cf.
Webster dictionary). In my view this interpretation can be linked with Joas’
corporality. The employees of a firm can have a collective perspective, knowledge
and skill and their organized capability is what embodies business. Therefore
understanding any action, whether individual or collective, creative, rational or
normative, comes from an embodied (collective) mind with a background of former
experiences. This constitutive principle applies also to sociality, as humans are
social beings and social actors, which means they do not just happen to be social but
sociality is inextricably part their agency. Joas defines sociality as ‘‘a structure of
common action which initially consists solely of our interaction with other bodies’’
(184). The sociality of action links clearly to Bourdieu’s ‘‘logic of practice’’ in
which practices are submitted to hidden structures and dynamics (Bourdieu and
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Wacquant 1992). Practice is not a pure intelligent product, but a result of agents
socialized in a ‘‘field’’ of roles and relationships with various forms of social and
financial ‘‘capital’’ as competitive resources. From the views of Joas and Bourdieu,
entrepreneurship and its moral dimensions, can be analyzed from the facilities and
constraints that stimulate and restrict opportunities and innovations. Maybe
entrepreneurs are not the first in line to set moral ends, but they can be encouraged
to establish a public change or to promote publicly innovative ideas to the practice
(cf. Pozen 2008).
Pragmatic ethics as a transactional relation between means ends is comprises
dialectic. The case study reveals not only a Hegelian dialectic between animal
production and animal protection but more a Deweyan dialectic between the
individual (firm) and the state. The company’s view becomes in this sense the
company’s moral view. The VanDrie’s license to produce is a transaction of that
dialectic. A business end becomes a business’ moral end when it is positively
assessed from a societal perspective. Setting a moral ends-in-view is discovering
possible worlds in which the named conflicts do not exist and to explore ways to
create such worlds (Cf. McGillivray 2004 on politics, Bromley 2006 on economic
institutions). A moral end-in-view creates an imaginary world-in-the-making that is
believed to be better than the current one, and automatically sets the aim for
melioration. Setting an end-in-view is a matter of empathetic projection in the sense
of amplifying one’s perception beyond the immediate environment by regarding the
aspirations, interests, and worries of others (Fesmire 2003: 65ff; cf. McVea 2009).
For business this would mean not only stating a strategic intent in which the
industry’s future is envisioned (Hamel and Prahalad 1994) but to give proper
attention to those involved in the issue and to present them a world to look forward
to. A moral end-in-view implies that business resources (intellectual and material)
are at hand to contribution at least substantially to the social end. This ‘‘in-view’’
contribution towards a societal end must have some transparency because
company’s judgment must be publicly verifiable.
Transactional relation between means and ends makes that there can be no
efficacious (business) ethics without resources, just as there can be no mind without
a body and no organism without an environment. Ethics based on resources is one in
which aspiration and implementation transact. It should be noted that a complicated
factor in this transaction is the path dependency which pre-shapes reality (Nelson
and Winter 1982; David 1994). Path dependency means that choices made in the
past, e.g., regarding, housing, husbandry systems, soft- and hardware, can still cause
impact on present situations when they restrict a revision of those choices. This
technological fixedness can limit the dynamics in the means-end relation. From a
human resource point of view, the dynamics can be influenced by a social and
cultural anchor in the form of firm’s doxa as a set of beliefs that becomes accepted
as unquestioned, self-evident and, hence, as almost unchangeable (Bourdieu 1977:
164). Path dependency and doxa can be observed in the Dutch pork chain. Greef and
Casabianca (2009), describe how current husbandry systems resist threats from the
market and society. One of their conclusions is: ‘‘it is difficult to think ‘out of the
box’ if you are part of that box.’’ There are inescapable complications in the means-
end relation, which make that ethics should not only accept that moral ends emerge
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from resources, but that there is certain inflexibility from path dependency and doxa
too. These insights make recourse-based ethics even more important because it
prevents that reason (aspiration) becomes too far-parted from experience
(implementation).
Room for Maneuver
The acknowledgment, that moral change comes from ends-in-view, generates
challenges. For ethics this may be to let new reason emerge from experience and for
entrepreneurship to generate new experience from reason. Bringing about moral
changes is being resourceful in making new ends-in-view. This resourcefulness is
finding room for maneuver in a pluralistic world of values and constraints in the
sense of identifying relevant ethical issues, interpreting these and creating solutions
(Korthals 2008). In the route towards the Better Life Hallmark, the VanDrie Group
as well as the DSPA had to change position. They had to move from their initial
stance towards, in Gadamerian terms, the horizon of the other. This hermeneutical
dimension of ethics encourages gaining a good understanding of a practice by
exchanging concrete and detailed experiences and perspectives. This process is
essential for getting to know what the other values and their ‘‘horizons’’ entail and to
open the possibility for a fusion of horizons (Gadamer 2004: 305). The VanDrie
Group and the DSPA both had to find ways to maneuver, to create more ability to
meliorate their own existence in the light of societal demands. They found a kind of
a playground to discover experimentally their moral interests (cf. Pompe and
Korthals 2009, 2010). They explored possibilities, socialized and at the same time
individualized their position and eventually grew from it.
The exploration of possibilities shows that sets of the collaboration were done
from different motivations. The VanDrie Group’s driving force is the vulnerability
of their ‘‘license to produce’’ in Dutch society. The production of veal is socially a
sensitive enterprise, because of the public human affection with young animals and
the luxury of the product compared with other meat merchandise. Dutch Parliament
have already put a ban on mink farming from 2018 and VanDrie fears that public
attention to calves, as young appealing animals, can end in a similar prohibition.
Dialogue with society is therefore essential not as a one-way lobby but as an
exploration of demands and possibilities to improve qualities. VanDrie’s whole
strategy is aimed at constantly adapting to the social environment. The reality of the
market, politics and society changes continuously and hence the firm regards
(moral) entrepreneurship as never ending. The DSPA, on the other side, explores the
possibilities to move society towards a more animal friendly community. It takes
into account the limitations of action-based protests. Exploration is directed at
making the organization’s ideals realistic without losing their deeper meaning. The
animal protection ideals, philosophically formulated by utilitarian Peter Singer
(1973, 1993) and deontologist Tom Regan (1983), are more understood as one of
the many truths (cf. Posner 2004). It may be conceptual coherent to equate higher
animals and humans regarding their basic ability to suffer, or to ascribe inherent
value to all human and non-human subjects-of-life. However, it is questionable
326 V. Pompe
123
whether these forms of principled ethics are efficacious in improving animal welfare
(Pompe and Korthals 2009, 2010). Exploring ideals is, therefore, trying to match
them with the realities from a pluralistic society.
VanDrie and DSPA have their own network of relations but both socialized their
space of operation beyond the regular peers and politics. VanDrie invited the DSPA
for deliberation and the Society became an important advisor on animal issues. The
relationship is so close that they meet three a four times a year. The DSPA, on its
part, further socialized its room. First, by accepting VanDrie’s invitation, something
other animal protection organizations would not do. Second, by proactively
contacting other farmers and farm businesses for dialogue about welfare improve-
ments for hens and pigs (see the other welfare hallmarks ‘‘Volwaard’’ hen and
‘‘Comfort Class’’ for pigs). Part of socializing is finding ways to settle difficulties,
scoping out alternatives and, most importantly, picturing ourselves taking part in
them. This is a pragmatic way of deliberation that Dewey calls dramatic rehearsal
(Fesmire 2003: 70). Rehearsal illuminates current situations and opens them up, so
that new ways of thinking can be perceived. The rehearsal’s dramatic meaning is an
imagination that is stimulated to act in a line of melioration the stakeholder’s
position. The imagination tries to harmonize the pressing interests, needs, and other
factors of the situation by paying attention to all the bearings that could be foreseen
and by having the proper interest in knowing what is going on (Fesmire 2003: 74). It
is maybe the most important action in ethics.
By exploring and socializing their room for maneuver they both individualized
their rooms in the sense that the welfare hallmark (slightly) changed their identity.
VanDrie expressed not only its intention of social responsibility but more the actual
implementation and therefore the actual realization of it. The firm is a model for
other companies. It stands out by the successful implementation of its aspirations.
The DSPA’s identity changed from passive advisor on animal protection to active
initiator and mediator of alternative animal farming. More noticeably, the Society’s
identity changed with the presence of its logo on meat products. Individualizing in
an ethical context leans to the Aristotlean concept of phrone`sis (EN 1976) in which
the importance of practical wisdom is stressed as a form of deliberation about values
with reference to variable context-dependent practice. More experience and
practical knowledge means more awareness of the limitation of the application
and also of the improvements to be made (cf. Flyvbjerg 2003).
By maneuvering both organizations grew. For VanDrie this growth is not that much
market-related. The Better Life Hallmark is only for the Dutch market, which is small
with just a few percent of the firm’s total production. The main bulk of veal is exported to
countries such as France and Italy which have fewer welfare concerns than the
Netherlands. Growth for VanDrie refers more to welfare quality of their products as well
as the respect and the credits from society. For the DSPA, growth is not related to the
number of members that is declining. The growth is in the number of animals whose
existence has been improved (98% of all animals in the Netherlands are cattle). DSPA
grew also in a political and social sense by showing to be a reliable and reasonable
partner in working on projects some of its conservative members reject.
Room for maneuver is not finding certainty by seeking for correspondence with
reality or coherency within a set of proposition, as principle-oriented ethics does,
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but by looking for ‘‘what works,’’ what proves to have instrumental value.
Therefore, moral values are instrumental, but instrumental values need not to be
moral. Trying values out and experience them serves the ethical purpose of growing
morally in an ever-enduring process of perfecting, maturing, and refining.
The VanDrie-DSPA case shows that business and ethics do not need to be
considered as opposite fields. Entrepreneurship can mean new challenges for ethics
and vice versa. The relation between the VanDrie Group and DSPA is one in which
business and ethics react upon each other and change both as a consequence. Both
organizations found ways to fuse their different horizons on the economy and
animal welfare by loosening their ideologies a bit for the sake of creating something
new. The hallmark can be seen as a result of co-evolution between a commercial
and a social-political organization, or between business power and public power. It
can be seen as a managerial intentional co-evolution to change a situation
technologically, economically and socially (Volberda and Lewin 2003). It can also
be regarded as a co-evolution of alliances in which relationship between trust,
control, and learning change simultaneously (Inkpen and Currall 2004). The
internal maneuvers within and between the practices of VanDrie and DSPA,
resulting in the Better Life Hallmark, created more room for maneuver for others
too. Consumers can afford welfare friendly meat more easily and there is a greater
variety of choice. Room also increased for farmers with their possibility to upgrade
a husbandry system without imbalancing the cost-benefit equilibrium too much.
Interrelated practices caused a shift in the mosaics of values and the set of
constraints and created new moral niches. The awareness of one’s Room for
Maneuver renews ethics towards experience-based creation of values (Pompe and
Korthals 2009, 2010).
Conclusion and Discussion
The aim of this article is to explore the possibilities of a resource-based ethics. The
relationship between the VanDrie Group and the DSPA concerning the development
and implementation of a Better Life Hallmark for calves has been described and
analyzed. Both organizations show moral entrepreneurship by being pragmatic and
melioristic. They share the attitude of continuous adaptation to the ever changing
world and see that an (incremental) improvement of human and animal interest runs
through dialogue and partnership about the use of resources. They both take the
social, economic, and technological environment seriously and work from the
possibilities and limitations. Important to notice is the fact that co-operation and
moral progress do not need consensus. It is all about making ‘‘value conflicts’’
workable in a learning process. The hallmark result can be seen as a co-evolution in
which by interrelating practices values and constraints shift so a new moral niche
emerges. Both organizations show moral entrepreneurship in their ability to create
room for maneuver: by exploring interaction within one’s own organization and
between external parties, by socializing their actions through dialoguing with
counterparts and joining ventures, by individualizing and strengthening their
identity and finally by growing in quality and social respect. This article stresses the
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importance in ethics of the resources at hand, whether human competences or
technological capabilities, and of the capabilities people perform in using them.
However, looking more critically to this study, there are some points for discussion.
These relate to concerns about the motive of VanDrie in becoming moral, the
obligation to stay a front-runner in new developments and the public validity of the
hallmark.
Skeptic voices may accuse VanDrie of using ethics as a dressing for its economic
target to create new markets to compensate the loss of other segments. The veal calf
industry is subjected to socio-economic influences which almost halved the number
of calves slaughtered in France between 1984 and 2008. Sans and de Fontguyon
(2009) explain this fall with the reduction of calf numbers from the dairy herd after
milk quotas were introduced and the rise in the prices of production factors (bobby
calves, milk feed). There is also a change in the social-economical context. Milk
supply is no longer in excess, farmers hold on to female calves, more profitable use
of milk proteins in human nutrition than in animal feeds, slaughter premium is
decoupled and young people increasingly avoid veal. These economic developments
led probably to some changes. Integration management was further developed to
reduce costs through volume management and, externally, new market opportunities
were explored as a Better Life Hallmark veal. From this analysis the animal welfare
project is purely economically driven. Maybe so, but that is not important. What
counts is the welfare improvement and the attitude that it is just one step towards
better. Besides, it is clear that competitors, such as Lactalis/Tendriade, Denkavit and
Bigard, do not show much (economic) interest in animal welfare. Being a moral
entrepreneur creates expectations and obligations. On the innovation side, there
must be a continuous effort for improvement. In the veal calf industry this means
facing challenges to develop techniques, for instance, to feed the calves during
transport with warm milk. A technique, not possible yet, would make a great
welfare difference for the young cattle. Moral entrepreneurship is a long-term
commitment with social expectations.
Another concern directly related to the resource-based approach is that moral
targets or aspirations can be set too conservatively in order not to overstretch the
means. Starting from resources may limit of even kill aspirations. Seeing the
VanDrie’s motto ‘‘I can’’ before ‘‘I will,’’ it may arouse some skepticism since it
provides an easy way to avoid moral responsibility. An ethics based on resources
may lead to pardon one’s duties when capabilities are low: ‘‘I cannot’’ therefore ‘‘I
will not’’ might be the excuse.
A more complex concern is the validity and integrity of the data that justify the
hallmark. The interests of VanDrie and DSPA are entangled with their commitment
to pull through a welfare system. Both parties can be harmed when their agreement
lacks transparency regarding the compliance. How does the public know whether
the system is valid? What proof is there that the average Hb-level of all kept calves
is 6 mmol/l with none under 4.5 and for the hallmark 7 with none under 6? This is,
for the public, not clear and traceable and therefore VanDrie and DSPA have to
work on some transparent audit system. Whether that system is a first-party (sellers),
second-party (buyers) or third-party (independent) certification is not that relevant.
Pivotal is the transparency for consumer’s bodies, media, and science in order to
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debate publicly animal welfare claims in the livestock chain (cf. Hatanaka et al.
2005). One of the subjects of that public debate can be the first-party position
VanDrie and DSPA have regarding the hallmark, because they share the
responsibility of the quality they offer.
Obviously, there is already enough transparency regarding the firm’s abilities
especially in relation to the DSPA. Besides, the credibility and trustworthiness of
VanDrie, and DSPA alike, in the sector and society is too valuable to put at stake.
VanDrie has participated, for many years, in several committees and boards, ranging
from the butcher vocational training advisory committee to the Dutch National
Board for Animal Affairs (Raad voor Dieraangelegenheden). The DSPA has a
political and societal reputation, even in a European context, of admirable
proportions. The VanDrie Group and the DSPA take leadership seriously and are
aware of the social capital it can gain and lose (cf. Maak 2007). Nonetheless, these
concerns should not be ignored, firstly by VanDrie and DSPA but also publicly.
The VanDrie–DSPA case provides sufficient insight into a practice in which
resource-based ethics actually occurs. This form of ethics opens a new input in the
public debate. A debate not only on what a firm or organization achieves but even
more on what it could achieve. Available resources should, therefore, not be
exclusively defined by the one who sets the end-in-view. If it concerns moral
change, resources should become transparent to such an extent that it serves the
social debate without compromising the company’s competitiveness. The focus in
the moral debate should be more on capabilities for change than on the change itself
(cf. Sen 2009). Questions to guide the debate are ‘‘what can it do?,’’ ‘‘how much
from within?,’’ and ‘‘where are the potentialities?’’ A pathway for workable
business ethics runs along the situational, corporeal, and social lines.
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